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Abstract 
The purpose of study to find out how big the financial ratios related to Non Performing 
Loan (NPL), Operating Expense to Operating Income (OEOI), Loan to Deposit Ratio 
(LDR), and Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) in terms of affecting profitability that occurred 
in Rural Banks in Pekanbaru City. The population in this study using Rural Banks in 
Pekanbaru City since 2012 until 2015. The number of Rural Banks in Pekanbaru City as 
many as 19 RB. Of the total population is taken a sample by using purposive sampling 
method based on certain criteria. From the sampling criteria can be obtained the number 
of Rural Banks that meet the criteria of 13 RB. The result of study that operational risks 
proxied through BOPO variables have a negative and significant impact on Return On 
Assets (ROA), is due to high operational costs of BR is still not working efficiently, thus 
lowering ROA. liquidity risk proxied through LDR variable has a positive and significant 
impact on profitability BR. This indicates that any increase in LDR will be followed by 
increased profitability, where as the amount of credit disbursed increases, the income from 
such credit will increase so that the bank's ability to earn profit is also increasing. 
Keywords  : bank performance, Rural Banks and Return On Assets   
 
1. Introduction 
These two types of banks can be found in most countries in the world. There are 
private owned banks and government owned banks, but the uniqueness of Indonesian 
banking system is that there is another owned banks category, which is called the rural 
banks (bank perkereditan rakyat, BPR). One form of microfinance institutions (MFIs) for 
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poverty reduction is a Rural Bank or hereinafter referred to as RB. RB as one of the 
banking institutions has an important role in supporting the economy of Indonesia. One 
role of RB is difficult to help people who have access to bank lending public funds so 
that people do not need to borrow money from moneylenders.  
RB also participate in supporting the development of Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) in Indonesia, which became one of the largest business sectors in 
Indonesia, is assisting the government in job creation. RB role here is to help the 
development of SMEs through lending capital raised from public funds; RB should 
improve their business performance. With good financial performance, the public 
confidence in the RB as financial institutions collector and distributor of funds will also 
be higher. RB in Indonesia exist in every district. RB has two systems, namely Islamic 
banking  and conventional banking. Hence this study will try to identify whether the 
bank system pattern will affect the bank performance. Why the rural bank performance at 
Pekanbaru?. These are the questions that the study wishes to answer.  
The development of Rural Banks in Pekanbaru City is very fast nowadays, because 
of the increase of bank units. BR is one of the business entities that provide banking 
services to micro, small and medium enterprises. Increasingly, the increasing credit units, 
time deposits, savings deposits, and withdrawals of funds in the bank, thus raising a risk 
faced by rural banks, the risks that may occur are credit risk, operational risk, and liquidity 
risk, these risks will cause losses to the bank if not managed properly. 
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Based on these developments, people and investors can measure financial 
performance through the financial statements of Rural Banks. The financial performance of 
a company is often measured by how the ability of a company to generate profits. From a 
management point of view, the ratio of Retrun On Assets (ROA) is seen as a useful 
measure because it indicates how well the management utilizes the total resources owned 
by the company to generate profits. Profitability ratios used are Return On Assets (ROA) 
which is the ratio of net profit before tax to total assets. The greater the ROA, the greater 
the profitability which means the better the company's performance, the performance of 
rural banks experienced fluctuations (not fixed) income or profit every year. The following 
data Ratio Profitability Rural Bank In Pekanbaru City. 
              Research on the influence of financial ratios on previous profitability has been 
done by several other studies. From the results of this study seen the difference in the 
influence of financial ratios to the level of profit gain. RB looks still cannot maximize 
profitability, it is seen from ROA ratio obtained is still below the minimum limit set by the 
bank Indonesia is 1.5%. Return On Asset at Rural Banks is currently experiencing 
fluctuations from year to year, this is due to the unstable growth in profit at the Rural Bank. 
The decline in earnings in Rural Banks is due to high credit failure, and the bank's 
operational expenses are too large and inefficient. 
             Therefore, this study aims to find out how big the financial ratios related to Non 
Performing Loan (NPL), Operating Expense to Operating Income (OEOI), Loan to 
Deposite Ratio (LDR), and Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) in terms of affecting 
profitability that occurred in Rural Banks in Pekanbaru City. 
 
4 
 
2. Review of Literature 
 
2.1. Financial Intermediary Theory 
The main function of the bank is as a financial intermediary where the bank will sell a 
financial claiming product on the bank such as savings account and current account. At the 
same time, banks will also purchase financial products such as mortgages, business loans 
and personal loans. With this activity the financial transfers occur from units with surplus 
funds to units with insufficient funds through financial intermediaries. Financial 
intermediaries have advantages over individual or non-financial companies due to three 
factors. First, financial institutions or intermediaries can reduce transaction costs such as 
search costs, information costs and contract costs. The cost of information exists because 
there is one party who does not know exactly about the information related to the other 
party. 
There are two situations of asymmetric information in financial markets ie adverse 
selection, which occurs before a transaction occurs, and the moral hazard, which arises after 
a transaction (Allen & Santomero, 1998). Adverse selection occurs when the surplus unit 
has no accurate information regarding unit deficit. Therefore, the lack of information about 
the deficit unit will expose the surplus unit to greater risk if the surplus unit lend to a deficit 
unit. Financial institutions through experience can reduce the adverse selection problem. 
Moral hazard refers to the misuse of the loan obtained by the deficit unit where the 
deficit unit will use the loan for a more risky and different purpose than the stated purpose 
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of the loan application. Financial institutions can mitigate moral hazard problems through 
loan contracts and oversight over the operations of deficit units. 
The advantage of the second financial institution is that financial institutions can enjoy 
economies of scale as financial institutions have the ability to handle large and large-scale 
transactions. Therefore, financial institutions can reduce the fixed cost for each unit of 
output. Thirdly, since financial institutions have the advantage of evaluating a decent loan 
deal, it ensures that the loan issued will have a lower risk. Furthermore, financial 
institutions will manage a large amount of loans. Thus, financial institutions can diversify 
their portfolio and thus reduce the risk of such financial institutions. This is different from 
those of non-financial intermediaries or companies who do not have the skills in assessing a 
loan and do not have a large capital to diversify their portfolio. 
2.2. Agency Theory  
In the area of study of the influence of ownership on bank performance, the most 
frequently used theory is agency theory. Agency theory describes the relationship between 
the owner as a principal and manager as an agent. The relationship is very important 
because it affects the performance of a bank. Thus the competitiveness of a bank depends 
largely on the ability of managers to manage their respective banks. In addition to the 
magnitude of the role of managers in managing the bank in order to perform well, the role 
of the bankers is also vital for monitoring and ensuring that managers are working hard to 
advance the bank under its management. 
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Therefore, in the relationship between the bank owner and the manager usually there 
will be a performance contract where the bank owners are aligning the interests of the 
manager with the interests of the bank's owner. Performance contracts are formed so that 
rewards received by managers are closely linked to bank performance. The contractual 
relationship between the owner and the manager is in line with agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) reveal that the difference in importance 
between owners and managers that creates an agency conflict occurs because the manager 
does not hold company shares or has insufficient ownership. 
The concept of agency as disclosed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) can be seen in the 
results of the study of Berger and Bonnaccorsi (2006), Basu et al. (2007) and Sulivan and 
Spong (2007) which indicate that bank owners are handing over to the manager as an agent 
to manage the bank. This is because the owner has difficulty managing the company 
directly because of the following factors. First, the size of a growing bank will be difficult 
to manage. Second, the need for specialized expertise to manage large banks and generally 
the owners have no such expertise. Third, bank ownership is determined by the number of 
shareholders. If the number of shareholders is too high and each person holds a small 
number of shares then this situation does not allow all owners to manage the activities of 
banks effectively. 
The manager can be seen as an agent by the bank owner who appoints them and is 
authorized and responsible for making the best decisions in the interest of shareholders. 
One way to measure success and efficiency of managers is to look at the profitability of the 
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bank. Performance can be measured through bank's ability to secure a stable profit while at 
the same time maintaining shareholder wealth increase in the company. 
Berger and Bonnaccorsi (2006) point out that managers may ignore the interests of 
shareholders, instead paying attention to their interests such as job continuity, luxury 
lifestyle, professional membership, personal vehicle facilities, all of which are borne by the 
company. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) stipulate to address agency issues, shareholders have 
incentives to monitor managers so as to minimize the problem of principal-agents. 
However, the level of incentives depends on shareholder ownership. If the owner holds a 
small number of shares, the owner will not have the incentive to monitor the manager's 
behavior. This is because the profit earned by the owner is less than the cost of supervision. 
Therefore, it is expected that private banks, most of which are owned by a family, will have 
a better performance compared to government-owned banks. 
For a bank that is largely owned by the family, conflicts between bank owners and 
managers are rare. Arifin (2003) notes that when a majority of the shares are owned by the 
family, it reduces the agency's problems compared to companies owned by many 
shareholders. In Indonesia, 90 percent of the company's shares are owned and operated by a 
family. This situation is not much different from other countries such as Spain (La Porta et 
al., 1999). Arifin (2003) states that the advantages of a family owned and operated 
company are family members will manage the company and this will reduce agency 
problems. However, because a family is also a manager of the company, the agency 
problem will arise between the family, as a majority shareholder and a minority 
shareholder. In addition, according to Allen et al. (2011) bank capital also affects the 
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performance of a bank. Due to the large capital of private banks in Indonesia issued by 
individuals or families, they have higher incentives to monitor loans issued due to bank 
performance and their wealth will be affected by repayments 
. Government-owned companies may not be efficiently managed because the board 
and management do not hold any shares in the company. This causes the company's 
performance to be affected (Megginson, et al, 1994; Megginson & Netter, 2001). The 
agency problem in the context of government ownership is more complicated as the 
government holds shares in the company on behalf of the public or the people. Since 
governments are led by politicians who have no ownership in these companies, they may 
not monitor the actions of the board of directors or management. In addition, the objective 
of a politician who leads a government may differ from an individual who owns a business. 
Shleifer (1998) and La Porta et al. (2002) states that governments tend to meet political 
goals that may negatively affect the financial performance of the company. This view is 
supported by Paskelian (2006) and Xu and Wang (1999) stating that the company becomes 
inefficient due to an agency problem arising from government political motives. In 
addition, government-owned banks may have lower profits because they finance a project 
that does not bring financial gain but brings social benefits. 
The study Berger and Bonaccorsi (2006), Mashharawi and Al-zu’bi (2009), Barry et 
al. (2011), Hoffmann (2011), Gul et al. (2011) and Trujillo-Ponce (2011) found that the 
ratio of equity have  negative influence on ROE. This suggests that the cost of the agency 
consistent with the theory that the increased use of debt to increase ROE. Meanwhile 
Mashharawi and Al-Zu'bi (2009), Alexiou and Sofoklis (2009), Sufian (2010), Davydenko 
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(2010), Sufian and Majid (2010), Barry et al. (2011), Javaid et al. (2011), Ramadan (2011), 
Riewsathirathorn et al. (2011) and Sufian and Habibullah (2012) found that the ratio of 
equity have  a positive influence on ROA. This shows the high equity ratio to increase 
banks' ability to overcome the loss of assets, including loans, increase the income of the 
bankruptcy cost reduction, higher gain if do offer some product expansion in profitable 
bank. High equity can reduce the amount of outside capital requirement which is higher 
than the cost of equity capital to be able to reduce bank profits. 
Sufian (2011) and Trujillo-Ponce (2011) found that the ratio of loans to assets have 
positive influence on ROA and ROE. While Mamatzakis and Remoundos (2003), 
Staikouras and Wood (2005), Fernandez et al. (2005), Trivieri (2007), Mashharawi and Al-
zu’bi (2009) and Gul et al. (2011) found that the ratio of loans have a positive influence on 
the ROA. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) Kosmidou et al. (2007), Garcia-Herrero et 
al. (2009) and Javaid et al. (2011) found that the ratio of loans to assets have an influence 
on ROA.  
The findings Beck et al. (2005), Mashharawi and Al-zu’bi (2009) and Mirzaei et al. 
(2011) found that the ratio of operating costs to total assets has a negative influence on 
ROA and ROE. Meanwhile Kosmidou et al. (2007) showed that the ratio of operating costs 
to total assets has no influence on ROA. 
3. Data and Methods 
 
The population in this study using Rural Banks in Pekanbaru City since 2012 until 2015. 
The number of Rural Banks in Pekanbaru City as many as 19 RB. Of the total population is 
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taken a sample by using purposive sampling method based on certain criteria. From the 
sampling criteria can be obtained the number of Rural Banks that meet the criteria of 13 
RB. Multiple linear regression equation as follows: 
Y = α + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + ε 
Y = ROA 
X1 = Credit Risk (NPL) 
X2 = Operational Risk (OEOI ) 
X3 = Liquidity Risk (LDR) 
X4 =  Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 
ε = Residual 
 
 
4. Result and Discussion 
Table 1 
The result Regression  
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 13.216 .932   14.180 .000 
NPL .002 .041 .004 .050 .961 
OEOI -.138 .011 -.978 -12.101 .000 
LDR .015 .005 .202 3.253 .002 
CAR -.016 .019 -.068 -.838 .406  
 
 
Based on the results if statistical data can be seen that the credit risk proxied 
through NPL has a positive but not significant effect on profitability of BR. This indicates 
that the RB has other income that can overcome the losses of NPLs.  
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Based on the results of processed statistical data can be seen that operational risks 
proxied through OEOI variables have a negative and significant impact on ROA, is due to 
high operational costs of BR is still not working efficiently, thus lowering ROA. The 
results of this study in consistent with  previous research is Beck et al. (2005), Mashharawi 
and Al-zu'bi (2009) and Mirzaei et al. (2011) Luh and Ni Luh (2013). 
Based on the results of processed statistical data can be seen that liquidity risk 
proxied through LDR variable has a positive and significant impact on profitability BR. 
This indicates that any increase in LDR will be followed by increased profitability, where 
as the amount of credit disbursed increases, the income from such credit will increase so 
that the bank's ability to earn profit is also increasing. The results of this study are 
consistent with previous research of Sufian (2011) and Trujillo-Ponce (2011) found that the 
ratio of loans to assets have a positive influence on ROA and ROE. While Mamatzakis and 
Remoundos (2003), Staikouras and Wood (2005), Fernandez et al. (2005), Trivieri (2007), 
Mashharawi and Al-zu'bi (2009) and Gul et al. (2011) and Si Luh and I Gusti (2014). 
Based on the results of research, CAR has negative and insignificant effect on 
Return On Assets (ROA). This is caused by the increase in own capital cannot increase 
credit. The results of this study are inconsistent with  previous research such as  
Mashharawi and Al-Zu'bi (2009), Alexiou and Sofoklis (2009), Sufian (2010), Davydenko 
(2010), Sufian and Majid (2010), Barry et al. (2011), Javaid et al. (2011), Ramadan (2011), 
Riewsathirathorn et al. (2011), Sufian and Habibullah (2012) and Si Luh and I Gusti (2014) 
found that the ratio of equity have a positive influence on ROA. 
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 Conclusion 
 
In this study, we examine the Rural Banks in Pekanbaru City performance of 
community development banks in Indonesia from 2012 to 2015. Our study uncovers 
interesting results. We find that the the result of study that Based on the results if statistical 
data can be seen that the credit risk proxied through NPL has a positive but not significant 
effect on profitability of BR. Operational risks proxied through OEOI  variables have a 
negative and significant impact on Return On Assets (ROA), is due to high operational 
costs of BR is still not working efficiently, thus lowering ROA. liquidity risk proxied 
through LDR variable has a positive and significant impact on profitability BR. This 
indicates that any increase in LDR will be followed by increased profitability, where as the 
amount of credit disbursed increases, the income from such credit will increase so that the 
bank's ability to earn profit is also increasing. CAR has negative and insignificant effect on 
Return On Assets (ROA). This is caused by the increase in own capital cannot increase 
credit.  
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